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Abstract	  Studies	  on	  employee-­‐ownership	  have	  generally	  focused	  on:	  
• Efficiency	  gains,	  	  
• Survival	  rate	  increases,	  	  
• Employee	  attitude	  benefits,	  and	  	  
• Measures	  of	  structural	  performance.	  However,	  the	  study	  of	  the	  longevity	  of	  the	  benefits	  and	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  employee-­‐owned	  companies	  have	  found	  themselves	  thriving	  for	  longer	  periods	  of	  time	  have	  remained	  largely	  untouched	  by	  rigorous	  analysis.	  	  This	  study	  examines	  both	  of	  these	  areas	  using	  employee	  attitude	  survey	  data	  collected	  through	  the	  National	  Center	  for	  Employee-­‐Ownership	  (NCEO).	  	  The	  study	  reveals	  no	  significant	  correlation	  through	  regression	  analysis	  between	  the	  age	  of	  the	  company	  and	  the	  attitude	  benefits	  resulting	  from	  an	  Employee	  Stock	  Ownership	  Plan	  (ESOP),	  but	  it	  does	  find	  some	  evidence	  that	  a	  link	  may	  exist.	  The	  study	  also	  provides	  evidence	  that	  education	  and	  engagement	  of	  the	  labor	  force	  significantly	  impacts	  employee	  attitudes.	  	  Given	  recent	  published	  research	  stating	  that	  employee	  attitudes	  and	  well-­‐being	  are	  critical	  factors	  for	  the	  productivity	  in	  the	  workforce,	  this	  study	  suggests	  these	  two	  very	  significant	  determinants	  of	  employee	  attitudes	  that	  have	  been	  overlooked	  by	  researchers	  and	  policy	  makers	  who	  have	  evaluated	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  ESOPs	  to	  our	  economy.	  
	  
Introduction	  “Shared	  Capitalism”	  in	  the	  workplace	  has	  been	  studied	  because	  of	  its	  perceived	  bounty	  versus	  actual	  benefits	  to	  both	  workers	  and	  owners	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Based	  on	  Gallup	  polls	  summarized	  by	  Douglas	  Kruse	  and	  Joseph	  Blasi	  in	  1994,	  employees	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  prefer	  a	  share	  in	  the	  company	  over	  immediate	  cash	  in	  their	  paychecks	  now,	  and	  80%	  believe	  that	  employers	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  contribute	  company	  stock	  to	  retirement	  plans.	  1	  Others	  have	  argued	  that	  shared	  capitalism	  is	  a	  fundamental	  principle	  on	  which	  the	  United	  States	  was	  founded	  and	  on	  which	  it	  functions	  politically	  and	  economically.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Kruse,	  Douglas.	  "Research	  Evidence	  on	  Prevalence	  and	  Effects	  of	  Employee	  
Ownership."Www.nceo.org.	  NCEO,	  n.d.	  Web.	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ESOPs	  are	  tax	  qualified	  plans	  in	  which	  tax	  breaks	  are	  given	  to	  companies	  by	  the	  government	  in	  return	  for	  companies	  giving	  employees	  an	  ownership	  stake	  in	  their	  company.	  	  An	  ESOP	  company	  creates	  an	  employee	  stock	  ownership	  trust	  through	  which	  owners	  use	  profits	  to	  facilitate	  the	  sale	  of	  the	  company	  to	  employees	  over	  time	  in	  one	  of	  three	  ways	  by:	  	  
• Contributing	  company	  shares	  to	  the	  “trust,”	  	  
• Contributing	  cash	  to	  purchase	  shares	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  employees,	  or	  	  	  
• Creating	  a	  Trust	  that	  can	  borrow	  money	  and	  make	  payments	  to	  the	  ESOPs	  employee	  trust	  to	  pay	  the	  owner	  for	  his/her	  shares.	  	  2	  	  Shares	  of	  the	  company	  are	  then	  allocated	  to	  employees	  based	  on	  company	  specified	  criteria	  such	  as	  salary	  and	  seniority.	  	  Any	  employee	  over	  the	  age	  of	  21	  is	  allowed	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  ESOP,	  but	  there	  is	  generally	  a	  vesting	  period	  of	  up	  to	  six	  years	  at	  which	  time	  the	  employee	  can	  receive	  the	  full	  value	  of	  his	  or	  her	  shares	  of	  the	  ESOP.	  	  ESOPs	  can	  have	  anywhere	  from	  5%	  to	  100%	  of	  their	  total	  capitalization	  owned	  by	  the	  employee	  trust.	  Creating	  an	  ESOP	  shelters	  from	  taxation	  the	  capital	  gains	  of	  the	  company’s	  previous	  owners	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  eliminates	  any	  capital	  gains	  tax.	  	  An	  ESOP	  also	  	  reduces	  the	  taxes	  payable	  by	  the	  company	  on	  an	  ongoing	  basis,	  for	  example	  by	  permitting	  the	  company	  to	  deduct	  from	  its	  taxable	  income	  not	  only	  the	  interest	  paid	  on	  money	  borrowed	  to	  set	  up	  the	  trust,	  but	  also	  the	  principal	  repayments.	  ESOP	  growth	  has	  been	  strong	  since	  they	  were	  officially	  sanctioned	  in	  1974	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  ERISA	  (Employee	  Retirement	  Income	  Security	  Act	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Rodrick,	  Scott	  S.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  ESOPs.	  Oakland,	  CA:	  National	  Center	  for	  Employee	  Ownership,	  2010.	  Print.	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1974).	  	  ESOPs,	  very	  seldom	  known	  at	  the	  time,	  were	  not	  included	  in	  the	  original	  version	  of	  ERISA.	  	  However	  after	  oversight	  of	  ESOPs	  were	  brought	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  Senator	  Russell	  B.	  Long	  he	  invited	  one	  of	  the	  early	  advocates	  of	  employee	  ownership	  to	  discuss	  the	  inclusion	  of	  them	  in	  the	  bill.	  	  After	  the	  meeting,	  long	  felt	  that	  ESOPs	  could	  be	  a	  revitalizing	  force	  for	  the	  economy.3	  Based	  on	  the	  potential	  for	  ESOPs	  to	  benefit	  employees	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  create	  an	  outlet	  for	  small	  business	  owners	  to	  sell	  their	  companies,	  ESOPs	  were	  granted	  tax	  reductions.	  4	  The	  most	  recent	  Department	  of	  Labor	  data	  report	  that	  between	  17	  and	  20	  million	  employees	  are	  registered	  in	  defined	  contribution	  plans.	  	  Of	  that	  total,	  approximately	  13	  million	  employees	  are	  participating	  in	  ESOPs.5	  	  The	  sheer	  magnitude	  of	  the	  U.S.	  labor	  force	  involved	  in	  employee-­‐ownership	  plans,	  and	  the	  reduction	  in	  U.	  S.	  taxes	  paid	  to	  such	  employee-­‐owned	  companies	  warrants	  close	  study	  on	  the	  topic.	  The	  most	  comprehensive	  study	  of	  ESOPs	  examines	  an	  ESOP’s	  ability	  to	  yield	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  the	  productivity	  and	  efficiency	  of	  a	  workforce.	  	  In	  general,	  a	  driving	  force	  behind	  productivity	  and	  efficiency	  from	  any	  company	  results	  from	  positive	  employee	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  company	  in	  an	  ESOP.	  	  As	  a	  reasonable	  extension	  to	  that	  accepted	  productivity	  maxim,	  it	  was	  theorized	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  ESOP,	  if	  employees	  identify	  themselves	  as	  owners	  and	  believe	  that	  they	  have	  a	  direct	  impact	  on	  the	  future	  success	  of	  the	  company	  and	  hence	  their	  personal	  wealth,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Menke,	  John	  D.	  "The	  Origin	  and	  History	  of	  the	  ESOP	  and	  Its	  Future	  Role	  as	  a	  Business	  Succession	  Tool."	  The	  Menke	  Group	  The	  Nations	  Premier	  ESOP	  Advisors	  and	  Administrators.	  N.p.,	  n.d,	  Web.	  03	  May	  2013.	  4	  Ibid	  5	  Rodrick	  2010	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they	  will	  put	  more	  effort	  in	  their	  work.6	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  alignment	  of	  worker	  and	  company	  incentives,	  the	  company	  will	  realize	  significant	  productivity	  gains	  to	  the	  joint	  benefit	  of	  the	  company	  and	  its	  employee-­‐owners.	  	  	  A	  review	  of	  multiple	  studies	  examining	  well-­‐being	  in	  the	  workplace	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  business	  outcomes	  has	  concluded	  that	  	  “The	  well-­‐being	  perspective	  is	  quite	  applicable	  to	  business	  and	  that,	  as	  managers	  and	  employees	  focus	  on	  satisfying	  basic	  human	  needs	  in	  the	  workplace	  –	  clarifying	  desired	  outcomes	  and	  increasing	  opportunity	  for	  individual	  fulfillment	  and	  growth—they	  may	  increase	  the	  opportunity	  for	  the	  success	  of	  their	  organization”7	  	  The	  concept	  that	  employee	  productivity	  will	  increase	  if	  employee	  attitudes	  and	  sense	  of	  well-­‐being	  are	  nourished	  is	  a	  concept	  that	  ESOP	  strives	  to	  accomplish.	  While	  traditional	  shareholder-­‐owned	  companies	  align	  shareholder	  wealth	  with	  company	  success,	  ESOPs	  align	  employee	  wealth	  with	  company	  success	  by	  making	  employees	  the	  company’s	  partial	  or	  entire	  shareholders.	  	  This	  alignment	  of	  incentives	  provides	  a	  multitude	  of	  potential	  benefits	  that	  can	  help	  solve	  problems	  modern	  firms	  face.	  All	  firms	  in	  the	  modern	  day	  face	  an	  asymmetrical	  information	  problem	  when	  drafting	  a	  contract	  between	  an	  employee	  and	  an	  employer.	  	  	  The	  employee	  offers	  his/her	  time	  and	  agrees	  to	  an	  inherently	  unenforceable	  level	  of	  effort	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  firm	  in	  exchange	  for	  receiving	  a	  wage.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  immeasurability	  of	  the	  level	  of	  effort	  the	  employer	  must	  create	  ways	  to	  monitor,	  incent,	  and	  discipline	  his	  or	  her	  workforce.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Pendleton,	  Andrew,	  Nicholas	  Wilson,	  and	  Mike	  Wright.	  "The	  Perception	  and	  Effects	  of	  Share	  Ownership:	  Empirical	  Evidence	  from	  Employee	  Buy-­‐Outs."	  British	  Journal	  of	  Industrial	  Relations	  36.1	  (1998):	  99-­‐123.	  Print.	  	  7	  Harter	  J,	  Schmidt	  F,	  Keyes	  C.	  Well-­‐being	  in	  the	  workplace	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  business	  outcomes	  	  A	  review	  of	  the	  gallup	  studies.	  Flourishing:	  The	  Positive	  Person	  and	  the	  Good	  Life.	  2002:205.	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   Samuel	  Bowles	  and	  Herbert	  Gintis	  coin	  the	  term	  contested	  exchange	  to	  describe	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  contract.	  	  They	  define	  an	  exchange	  as	  contested	  when	  “some	  aspect	  of	  the	  good	  exchanged	  possesses	  an	  attribute	  that	  is	  valuable	  to	  the	  buyer,	  is	  costly	  to	  provide,	  and	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  difficult	  to	  measure	  or	  otherwise	  subject	  to	  determinate	  contractual	  specification.”8	  	   A	  capitalistic	  firm	  will	  incur	  costs	  that	  an	  employee-­‐owned	  firm	  might	  be	  able	  to	  avoid.	  	  In	  a	  traditional	  firm,	  the	  incentive	  driver	  is	  simply	  the	  threat	  of	  contract	  termination	  (i.e.	  firing	  the	  employee).	  	  However,	  this	  is	  only	  a	  threat	  if	  the	  employee	  is	  being	  paid	  more	  than	  his	  next	  best	  alternative	  which,	  theoretically,	  drives	  up	  wages.	  	  Capitalistic	  firms	  have	  costs	  associated	  with	  employee	  supervision	  whereas	  ESOP	  employee-­‐owners	  are	  expected	  to	  require	  less	  direct	  supervision	  and	  hence	  lower	  costs	  of	  incentive	  enforcement.	  The	  labor	  market	  poses	  another	  unique	  problem	  that	  an	  ESOP	  could	  potentially	  solve.	  The	  story	  of	  the	  “hold	  up	  problem”	  is	  one	  that	  describes	  a	  situation	  that	  arises	  when	  two	  parties	  (owner	  and	  employee)	  can	  work	  together	  most	  efficiently	  by	  cooperating,	  but	  cooperating	  may	  give	  the	  other	  party	  bargaining	  power.9	  	  This	  problem	  emerges	  in	  firms	  because	  of	  a	  divergence	  of	  interests	  between	  how	  the	  firm	  wants	  the	  employees	  to	  be	  trained	  and	  how	  the	  employees	  prefer	  to	  be	  trained.	  	  Future	  productivity	  comes	  at	  a	  cost	  to	  both	  the	  employee	  and	  the	  employer.	  	  	  	  In	  the	  firm’s	  case,	  the	  firm	  prefers	  that	  employee	  skill	  training	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Bowles,	  Samuel,	  and	  Herbert	  Gintis.	  "A	  Political	  and	  Economic	  Case	  for	  the	  Democratic	  Enterprise."	  
Economics	  and	  Philosophy	  9.01	  (1993):	  75.	  Print.	  	  9	  Holmstrom,	  Bengt,	  and	  John	  Roberts.	  "Boundaries	  of	  the	  Firm	  Revisited."	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  
Perspectives	  12.4	  (Fall	  1998):	  73-­‐94.	  Print.	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specific	  to	  the	  firm	  because	  that	  will	  increase	  the	  firm’s	  market	  value	  while	  making	  the	  employee	  no	  more	  valuable	  to	  other	  firms.	  	  By	  contrast,	  the	  employee	  benefits	  from	  acquiring	  a	  general	  skill	  that	  is	  valuable	  to	  many	  different	  firms.	  	  	  A	  general	  skill	  is	  more	  marketable	  than	  a	  specific	  skill	  and	  can	  increase	  the	  employee’s	  market	  value	  and	  force	  the	  company	  to	  increase	  his	  or	  her	  wage.	  	  	  An	  employee	  can	  threaten	  to	  quit	  and	  thereby	  bargain	  for	  a	  larger	  share	  of	  the	  surplus	  generated	  by	  the	  firm-­‐specific	  training.	  	  However,	  the	  employer	  may	  act	  strategically	  by	  threatening	  to	  dismiss	  the	  employee.	  	  In	  anticipation	  of	  this,	  employees	  and	  employers	  may	  choose	  to	  avoid	  any	  skill-­‐specific	  training	  which	  can	  result	  in	  sub-­‐optimal	  investment	  in	  human	  capital	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  both	  worker	  and	  employer.	  	  The	  fear	  of	  opportunistic	  behavior	  on	  both	  sides	  leads	  to	  wage	  rigidity	  and	  a	  less	  productive	  workforce	  where	  specific	  human	  capital	  is	  present.	  	  If	  an	  ESOP	  succeeds	  in	  strongly	  aligning	  the	  incentives	  between	  the	  firm	  and	  the	  employee’s	  well-­‐being,	  then	  an	  ESOP	  may	  have	  the	  unique	  ability	  to	  solve	  the	  hold-­‐up	  problem.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  realize	  that	  the	  ESOP	  organizational	  structure	  is	  a	  tool	  and	  not	  an	  immediate	  solution	  to	  motivational	  and	  incentive	  problems	  in	  the	  workplace.	  	  All	  the	  problems	  and	  the	  ESOP	  solution	  will	  boil	  down	  to	  the	  basics	  of	  how	  employees	  feel	  about	  their	  companies	  because,	  ultimately,	  the	  individual	  puts	  forth	  the	  effort.	  	  One	  employee-­‐owned	  company,	  NewAge	  industries,	  serves	  as	  a	  fluid	  model	  of	  an	  exemplary	  employee-­‐owned	  firm.	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NewAge	  Industries:	  Exemplary	  Model	  of	  an	  ESOP	  Company	  10	  	  	   While	  some	  ESOP	  companies	  simply	  view	  the	  ESOP	  structure	  as	  a	  way	  for	  the	  original	  owner	  to	  collect	  on	  the	  beneficial	  tax	  breaks	  given	  by	  the	  government,	  others	  will	  put	  forth	  the	  effort	  to	  unleash	  the	  power	  to	  improve	  efficiency	  and	  profitability	  that	  the	  ESOP	  structure	  permits.	  It	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  managers	  to	  not	  sit	  back	  and	  wait	  for	  the	  ESOP	  to	  work	  magic,	  but	  to	  be	  proactive	  in	  showing	  employees	  how	  they	  are	  doing.	  	  	  An	  active	  effort	  can	  come	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ESOP	  focused	  educational	  programs,	  personal	  wealth	  management	  programs	  for	  employees,	  programs	  to	  help	  employees	  understand	  how	  their	  behavior	  influences	  bottom	  line	  growth,	  events	  to	  highlight	  the	  benefits	  employees	  have,	  and	  lastly	  how	  the	  direct	  involvement	  of	  every	  employee-­‐owner	  increases	  the	  market	  value	  of	  both	  the	  company	  and	  their	  own	  future	  shares.	  	  	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  because	  of	  the	  way	  the	  ESOP	  is	  organized,	  employees	  involved	  in	  an	  ESOP	  will,	  over	  time,	  start	  to	  act	  more	  like	  owners	  and	  less	  like	  workers	  coming	  in	  every	  day	  looking	  only	  for	  their	  paycheck	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  week.	  	  This	  would	  show	  itself	  most	  strongly,	  and	  perhaps	  only,	  if	  employees	  understand	  the	  ESOP	  and	  become	  involved	  in	  the	  ESOP.	  NewAge	  Industries	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  company	  that	  goes	  above	  and	  beyond	  to	  encourage	  positive	  attitudes	  in	  its	  employees	  and	  sees	  the	  benefits	  firsthand.	  	  The	  owner	  of	  the	  company	  feels	  that	  an	  owner	  should	  not	  sit	  back	  and	  wait	  for	  the	  employees	  to	  get	  it,	  but	  be	  proactive	  in	  showing	  employees	  how	  they’re	  doing	  by	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  All	  information	  in	  this	  section	  was	  collected	  through	  an	  interview	  with	  Ken	  Baker	  on	  April	  5th	  2013,	  and	  through	  the	  Winning	  Workplaces	  article	  on	  NewAge	  Industries	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creating	  events,	  communicating	  finances,	  and	  cross	  training	  employees.	  	  The	  use	  of	  education	  and	  engagement	  in	  this	  ESOP	  result	  in	  exemplary	  benefits.	  Founded	  in	  1954,	  the	  company	  now	  touts	  $31	  million11	  in	  revenues	  and	  has	  been	  recognized	  as	  a	  top	  ten	  finalist	  for	  top	  small	  company	  workplaces	  by	  Winning	  Workplaces	  &	  Inc.	  Magazine.	  	  The	  company	  now	  has	  a	  40%	  ESOP	  as	  of	  December	  201312	  and	  is	  owned	  by	  over	  100	  employees	  who	  have	  an	  average	  tenure	  of	  8	  years.	  	  	  The	  company	  has	  used	  a	  gain	  sharing	  program	  where	  employees	  are	  given	  a	  share	  of	  the	  profits,	  but	  to	  get	  employees	  more	  involved,	  NewAge	  adopted	  an	  ESOP	  in	  2006.	  	  The	  owner	  of	  NewAge	  invests	  heavily	  in	  educating	  employees	  about	  the	  ESOP	  and	  this	  investment	  in	  employee	  education	  has	  seemed	  to	  pay	  off.	  Hour-­‐long	  seminars	  are	  provided	  to	  educate	  all	  new	  employees	  about	  their	  own	  and	  their	  company	  finances.	  	  Some	  of	  the	  things	  taught	  are:	  -­‐ Personal	  employee	  profit	  and	  loss	  statements	  -­‐ Business	  profit	  and	  loss	  statements	  	  -­‐ Retirement	  planning	  for	  the	  future	  -­‐ ESOP	  and	  NewAge	  history	  -­‐ How	  the	  ESOP	  is	  valued	  These	  tools	  provide	  employees	  with	  the	  incentive	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ability	  help	  the	  company	  succeed,	  and	  the	  information	  showing	  how	  that	  success	  affects	  them	  personally	  as	  owners.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  a	  conventional	  company	  in	  which	  employees	  only	  vaguely	  see	  how	  their	  efforts	  might	  help	  the	  company	  and,	  possibly,	  themselves.	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   The	  ESOP	  started	  in	  2006	  has	  gained	  over	  400	  percent13	  in	  value	  since	  then.	  	  Last	  year	  was	  the	  8th	  record	  breaking	  year	  in	  the	  last	  nine	  years	  for	  income	  and	  orders,	  including	  the	  deep	  recession	  years	  of	  2008	  and	  2009.	  	  During	  the	  recession,	  instead	  of	  laying	  off	  workers,	  NewAge	  saw	  it	  fit	  to	  continue	  to	  work	  to	  increase	  inventories	  of	  finished	  product	  and	  train	  employees	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  the	  organization	  that	  enabled	  the	  company	  to	  attract	  new	  customers.	  	  	  Employees	  in	  the	  NewAge	  ESOP	  demonstrate	  commitment	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  account	  values	  and	  their	  shares	  resulting	  in	  strong	  self-­‐monitoring	  (one	  of	  the	  problems	  identified	  in	  the	  contested	  exchange	  model).	  	  One	  of	  the	  programs	  in	  place	  is	  the	  offering	  of	  a	  $1,000	  bonus	  awarded	  to	  an	  employee	  who	  refers	  another	  employee	  that,	  after	  a	  six-­‐month	  trial	  period,	  is	  a	  good	  asset.	  	  This	  takes	  care	  of	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  bad	  risk	  associated	  with	  new	  hires,	  something	  that	  a	  similar	  firm	  may	  have	  trouble	  avoiding	  without	  the	  employee	  commitment.	  	  There	  have	  been	  cases	  at	  NewAge	  in	  which	  an	  employee	  was	  be	  asked	  if	  he/she	  knows	  anyone	  who	  would	  be	  a	  good	  fit	  for	  the	  company,	  and	  employees,	  concerned	  about	  maintaining	  the	  economic	  health	  of	  the	  company,	  have	  answered	  that	  none	  of	  their	  job-­‐seeking	  friends	  would	  benefit	  the	  company.	  	   The	  employees	  from	  across	  all	  salary	  ranges	  have	  a	  stronger	  understanding	  of	  NewAge	  than	  would	  employees	  at	  a	  similar,	  non-­‐employee-­‐owned	  company.	  	  In	  one	  case	  reported	  to	  me,	  a	  warehouse	  shipping	  manager	  approached	  a	  sales	  employee	  after	  a	  record	  breaking	  shipment	  day	  questioning	  the	  margins	  of	  the	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products	  being	  sold.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  entire	  company	  is	  looking	  at	  things	  the	  original	  owner	  would	  look	  at	  to	  increase	  the	  value	  of	  the	  company.	  	   NewAge	  Industries	  has	  shown	  how	  the	  investment	  in	  employee’s	  ownership	  identity	  through	  education	  and	  engagement	  results	  in	  company-­‐wide	  benefits.	  	  This	  ESOP	  has	  used	  its	  employee-­‐ownership	  status	  to	  its	  full	  potential	  and	  has	  flourished	  because	  of	  it.	  	  This	  study	  hopes	  to	  draw	  some	  conclusions	  on	  the	  general	  effect	  that	  education	  and	  engagement	  have	  on	  the	  commitment	  and	  belief	  employees	  have	  in	  the	  company.	  
Theory	  Opposing	  ESOPs	  	   There	  are	  two	  main	  arguments	  that	  criticize	  employee-­‐ownership:	  	  
• The	  prisoner’s	  dilemma	  problem	  (also	  known	  as	  the	  1/n	  problem);	  and	  	  
• The	  potential	  lack	  of	  diversification	  for	  employees’	  retirement	  funds	  	  
	  
Prisoners	  Dilemma	  	  	   The	  prisoner’s	  dilemma	  problem	  describes	  a	  game	  in	  which	  every	  player	  can	  reach	  the	  optimal	  outcome	  for	  the	  group	  by	  cooperating	  but	  can,	  individually,	  gain	  more	  by	  not	  cooperating.	  	  Ultimately,	  individuals	  can	  optimize	  their	  personal	  result	  by	  not	  cooperating;	  thereby	  achieving	  the	  least	  optimal	  outcome	  for	  the	  group.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  employee-­‐ownership,	  every	  employee	  benefits	  from	  the	  retirement	  plan	  and	  the	  hard	  work	  of	  others.	  	  However,	  assuming	  effort	  is	  costly,	  employees	  gain	  from	  “free	  loading”	  off	  other	  employee’s	  hard	  work	  while	  not	  working.	  	  This,	  critics	  argue,	  renders	  employee-­‐ownership	  a	  negative	  force	  on	  productivity.	  	  	  
13	  	  
	   Advocates	  of	  employee-­‐ownership,	  such	  as	  Martin	  Weitzman	  and	  Douglas	  Kruse,	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case	  in	  employee-­‐owned	  companies.14	  	  Depending	  on	  the	  situation,	  they	  argue	  that	  when	  the	  game	  is	  repeated	  (which	  mimics	  long-­‐term	  relationships	  between	  employees	  and	  employers)	  employers	  will	  punish	  and	  ostracize	  employees	  for	  not	  cooperating	  reaching	  the	  best	  outcome	  of	  the	  collective	  action	  problem.	  
	  
Lack	  of	  Diversification	  	  	   	  The	  second	  cited	  problem	  is	  lack	  of	  diversification	  of	  employee’s	  retirement	  portfolios.	  	  This	  is	  a	  valid	  concern	  because,	  if	  the	  company	  fails	  completely,	  the	  employees	  (as	  equity	  owners	  of	  the	  company)	  will	  not	  be	  taken	  care	  of	  and	  they	  will	  lose	  their	  retirement	  funds	  at	  the	  very	  same	  time	  as	  they	  lose	  their	  jobs	  (as	  is	  the	  United	  Airlines,	  Polaroid,	  and	  Enron	  cases).15	  	  Kruse	  suggests	  that	  even	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  lack	  of	  diversification	  employee	  owners	  have	  superior	  retirement	  provisions.16	  This	  situation	  can	  be	  avoided	  by	  ensuring	  that	  employee’s	  investment	  portfolios	  are	  diversified	  by	  having	  retirement	  accounts	  in	  a	  number	  of	  companies.	  	  	  More	  importantly,	  as	  a	  condition	  for	  ESOP	  formation,	  after	  a	  defined	  amount	  of	  time	  invested	  in	  the	  ESOP	  employees	  over	  age	  55	  are	  allowed	  to	  take	  a	  percentage	  of	  money	  out	  of	  the	  ESOP	  and	  put	  it	  in	  Blue	  Chip	  investments.	  	  This	  helps	  mitigate	  the	  cited	  diversification	  problem.	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  Weitzman	  M,	  Kruse	  D.,	  A.	  Blinder	  Profit	  sharing	  and	  productivity.	  Paying	  for	  Productivity.	  
1990:95.	  15	  Freeman	  S.	  Effects	  of	  ESOP	  adoption	  and	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  ownership:	  Thirty	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  of	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  and	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Theory	  Supporting	  ESOPs	  	   Theory	  supporting	  employee-­‐ownership	  revolves	  around	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  monetary	  incentive	  to	  align	  employee	  efforts	  with	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  company	  will	  result	  in	  a	  cooperative	  workplace.	  	  While	  economic	  theory	  predicts	  that	  this	  form	  of	  group	  rewards	  will	  result	  in	  low	  productivity	  some	  argue	  this	  can	  be	  overcome	  through	  cooperation	  among	  participants.	  	  	  A	  perfect	  alignment	  of	  interests	  would	  result	  in	  a	  very	  fluid	  environment	  in	  which	  neither	  employee	  nor	  employer	  is	  able	  to	  gain	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  other.	  	  	  	   In	  a	  perfect	  ESOP	  model,	  rational	  employees	  are	  doing	  everything	  they	  can	  to	  increase	  the	  future	  value	  of	  the	  company,	  while	  the	  company	  is	  offering	  all	  the	  resources	  that	  employee-­‐owners	  may	  need	  to	  accomplish	  this	  goal.	  	  Employees	  would	  have	  the	  incentive	  to	  monitor	  other	  employees’	  behavior	  by	  reporting	  or	  “out-­‐casting”	  those	  who	  are	  “free	  riders”	  on	  the	  efforts	  of	  others.	  	  	  This	  would	  not	  only	  reduce	  company	  monitoring	  costs	  because	  managers	  could	  more	  productively	  use	  their	  time	  rather	  than	  spending	  it	  monitoring	  others	  but	  it	  would	  also	  improve	  employee	  management	  relations.	  	  	  	   If	  an	  ESOP	  succeed	  in	  goal	  of	  aligning	  the	  interests	  of	  all	  parties	  it	  will	  not	  face	  the	  training	  problem	  that	  conventionally	  organized	  firms	  potentially	  face.	  	  Perfectly	  run	  employee-­‐owned	  firms	  may	  have	  the	  unique	  quality	  of	  an	  extremely	  happy	  and	  satisfied	  workforce.	  	  Through	  strong	  employee	  retention	  and	  manager-­‐employee	  relations,	  the	  employee-­‐owner	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  learn	  skills	  that	  benefit	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the	  company	  rather	  than	  aiming	  to	  develop	  only	  transferrable	  skills.	  	  Furthermore,	  a	  firm	  that	  is	  confident	  that	  an	  employee	  will	  not	  leave	  their	  employment	  for	  a	  different	  opportunity	  will	  more	  willingly	  offer	  general	  training	  that	  is	  valuable	  to	  both	  the	  employer	  and	  the	  employee.	  All	  said,	  it	  is	  unknown	  how	  many	  ESOP	  firms	  exhibit	  the	  perfect	  characteristics	  presented	  above.	  	  Without	  a	  proactive	  effort	  from	  management	  to	  realize	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  ESOP,	  the	  theoretical	  benefits	  will	  not	  materialize	  automatically.	  	  Specifically,	  rather	  than	  assuming	  employees	  will	  understand	  the	  benefits	  of	  an	  ESOP,	  the	  owner	  must	  proactively	  provide	  the	  tools	  to	  employees	  that	  will	  instill	  trust	  in	  the	  employee-­‐management	  team	  	  and	  enable	  employees	  to	  understand	  their	  identities	  as	  owners	  	  of	  the	  company.	  	  This	  education	  is	  required	  to	  enable	  an	  ESOP	  to	  realize	  its	  potential.	  
Previous	  Literature	  	   Literature	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  employee-­‐ownership	  can	  be	  divided	  studies	  that	  focus	  on	  one	  of	  four	  categories:	  (I)	  firm	  performance;	  (II)	  employment	  stability,	  growth,	  and	  firm	  survival;	  (III)	  employee	  wealth	  and	  wages;	  and	  (IV)	  employee	  attitudes.	  	  The	  majority	  of	  studies	  use	  public	  company	  datasets	  because	  the	  privately	  owned	  company	  datasets	  are	  limited	  and	  costly.	  	  	  
(I)	  Productivity	  	   Productivity	  in	  employee-­‐owned	  companies	  is	  touted	  as	  a	  benefit	  that	  results	  from	  the	  democratic	  structure	  of	  ESOPs.	  	  Essentially,	  by	  giving	  employees	  a	  stake	  in	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their	  company	  they	  will	  be	  assumed	  to	  work	  harder	  to	  increase	  the	  market	  value	  (and	  profitability)	  of	  the	  company.	  	  The	  channels	  through	  which	  they	  would	  add	  value	  would	  be	  most	  likely	  are	  through	  their	  own	  productivity	  and	  quality	  control	  that	  enhances	  the	  value	  of	  the	  product.	  	   Many	  studies	  have	  found	  no	  significant	  correlation	  between	  adoption	  of	  an	  ESOP	  and	  increased	  productivity.	  	  The	  strongest	  evidence	  found	  comes	  from	  a	  study	  conducted	  by	  Kruse	  and	  Blasi.	  	  The	  two	  researchers	  conducted	  a	  “meta-­‐analysis”	  of	  available	  studies	  hoping	  to	  link	  improved	  productivity	  with	  employee-­‐ownership.17	  	  They	  concluded	  that	  the	  disproportionate	  number	  of	  positive	  to	  negative	  links,	  shows	  that	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  small	  but	  positive	  link	  between	  employee-­‐ownership	  and	  productivity.	  	  Other	  studies	  have	  attempted	  to	  dismantle	  the	  conclusion	  that	  employee-­‐ownership	  has	  productive	  effects,	  however	  few	  have	  statistically	  significant	  results.	  	  	  
(II)	  Employment	  Growth,	  Stability,	  Firm	  Survival	  	   Employee-­‐owned	  firms,	  according	  to	  a	  2002	  study	  conducted	  by	  Park,	  Kruse,	  and	  Sesil,	  survive	  longer	  (on	  average)	  than	  matched	  traditional	  firms.18	  	  Such	  enhanced	  firm	  survival,	  along	  with	  employment	  growth	  and	  stability,	  and	  firm	  survival	  will	  have	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  employment	  attitudes	  in	  employee-­‐owned	  companies.	  	  The	  benefits	  of	  these	  three	  aspects	  of	  employee-­‐ownership	  are	  far	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Ibid	  18	  Park,	  Rhokeun,	  Douglas	  Kruse,	  and	  James	  Sesil.	  "Does	  Employee	  Ownership	  Enhance	  Firm	  Survival?"	  Advances	  in	  the	  Economic	  Analysis	  of	  Participatory	  and	  Labor-­‐Managed	  Firms	  8	  (2004):	  3-­‐33.	  Print.	  	  
17	  	  
reaching.	  	  Because	  of	  employment	  stability,	  both	  firms	  and	  its	  employee-­‐owners	  will	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  learn	  industry	  and	  firm	  specific	  skills	  rather	  than	  general	  skills.	  	  	  	   Studies	  conducted	  by	  Blair	  et	  al.	  (2000)	  and	  Craig	  and	  Pencavel	  (1992,93,95)	  found	  that	  along	  with	  survival	  of	  firms,	  employee	  tenure	  is	  longer	  in	  employee	  owned	  firms.	  	  Craig	  and	  Pencavel	  found	  evidence	  that	  in	  U.S	  plywood	  cooperatives	  (an	  alternate	  form	  of	  profit	  sharing)	  in	  the	  Pacific	  Northwest	  companies	  tended	  to	  adjust	  wage	  rates	  and	  refrain	  from	  layoffs.19	  	  Blair	  found	  that	  firms	  holding	  at	  least	  17%	  of	  company	  stock	  during	  the	  period	  from	  1983-­‐1985	  had	  significantly	  longer	  average	  employee	  tenure	  than	  similar	  non-­‐ESOP	  firms.	  	  20	  	   	  
(III)	  Employee	  Wealth	  and	  Wages	  	   Employee	  compensation	  is	  a	  hotly	  debated	  topic	  among	  ESOP	  researchers	  because	  of	  strong	  arguments	  on	  both	  sides.	  	  Those	  arguing	  against	  ESOPs	  assert	  that	  employee-­‐ownership	  plans	  contribute	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  diversification	  of	  retirement	  assets	  as	  employees	  retirement	  assets	  may	  be	  placed	  predominantly	  in	  their	  employer’s	  stock.	  	  However,	  findings	  on	  employee	  wealth	  and	  wages	  suggest	  otherwise.	  	  	  	   Based	  on	  study	  by	  Steven	  Freeman,	  the	  strongest	  evidence	  supports	  the	  conclusion	  that	  ESOPs	  enhance	  employee	  wealth	  and	  wages.	  	  Between	  ESOP	  firms	  and	  comparable	  non-­‐employee-­‐owned	  firms,	  compensation	  in	  the	  ESOP	  firms	  are	  at	  least	  as	  high,	  if	  not	  higher,	  than	  their	  matched	  counterparts.	  	  Studies	  conducted	  in	  Massachusetts	  and	  Washington	  State	  revealed	  that	  ownership	  wealth	  coming	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Freeman	  (2007)	  20	  Ibid.	  
18	  	  
ESOPs	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  substitute	  for	  current	  income,	  but	  serves	  as	  an	  additional	  source	  of	  wealth	  for	  employees.	  	  Freeman	  asserts	  that	  the	  higher	  compensation	  may	  reflect	  increased	  productivity,	  the	  use	  of	  high	  wages	  to	  motivate	  workers,	  the	  influence	  of	  employee-­‐owners	  setting	  higher	  wages	  for	  themselves,	  or	  benevolence	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  management.	  	  Whatever	  the	  cause,	  Freeman	  demonstrates	  that	  employee-­‐ownership	  results	  in	  higher	  average	  employee	  compensation.	  21	  	  
(IV)	  Employee	  Attitudes	  	   Employee	  attitudes	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  determining	  how	  well	  ESOPs	  function.	  	  The	  productivity	  benefits	  described	  before	  hinge	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  employees	  believe	  in	  their	  ESOP	  and	  believe	  it	  will	  benefit	  them.	  	  Kruse	  and	  Blasi	  note,	  “Employee-­‐ownership	  may	  have	  positive	  effects	  if	  employees	  value	  ownership	  in	  itself	  or	  perceive	  that	  it	  brings	  greater	  income,	  job	  security,	  or	  control	  over	  jobs	  and	  the	  workplace.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  may	  have	  negligible	  or	  even	  negative	  effects	  if	  employees	  perceive	  no	  difference	  in	  their	  work	  lives,	  dislike	  the	  extra	  risk	  to	  their	  income	  and	  wealth,	  or	  have	  raised	  expectations	  that	  are	  not	  fulfilled.”22	  	  	   There	  have	  been	  approximately	  two	  dozen	  studies	  completed	  on	  employee	  attitudes	  that	  offer	  cross-­‐sectional	  comparisons	  between	  owners	  and	  non-­‐owners,	  longitudinal	  analysis	  of	  pre-­‐ESOP	  and	  post-­‐ESOP	  adoption,	  and	  studies	  looking	  at	  how	  the	  different	  plan	  features	  affect	  employee	  attitudes.	  	  	   Studies	  conducted	  on	  employee	  attitudes	  have	  yielded	  mixed	  results.	  	  Despite	  those	  mixed	  results,	  few	  studies	  show	  employee-­‐ownership	  having	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Ibid.	  22	  Kruse	  (2002)	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negative	  effect	  on	  employee	  attitudes	  while	  many	  more	  show	  that	  employee-­‐ownership	  has	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  attitudes.23	  However	  when	  examined	  more	  closely,	  there	  do	  seem	  to	  be	  ways	  to	  influence	  the	  benefit	  to	  an	  employee-­‐owned	  firm.	  	  	   A	  study	  on	  employee	  attitudes	  found	  that	  while	  employee-­‐ownership	  is	  not	  intrinsically	  rewarding,	  it	  does	  appear	  to	  have	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  attitudes	  when	  coupled	  with	  financial	  rewards	  and	  participative	  management	  practices.	  24	  	  A	  second	  study	  shows	  communicating	  the	  financial	  results	  of	  the	  ESOP	  and	  the	  benefits	  accruing	  to	  employee-­‐owners	  results	  in	  increased	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  ESOP	  participants.	  25	  	  	  
Hypotheses	  This	  paper	  asks	  the	  questions:	  	  1) As	  employee-­‐owned	  companies	  mature,	  do	  employees	  better	  understand	  the	  plan	  and	  do	  they	  have	  increasing	  feelings	  of	  identification	  with	  the	  company?	  2) 	  	  Do	  employees	  understand	  the	  ESOP	  structure	  and	  do	  they,	  therefore,	  identify	  with	  and	  believe	  in	  the	  company?	  	  3) 	  Are	  CEO’s	  of	  ESOP	  companies	  able	  to	  capture	  the	  productivity	  and	  other	  “theoretical”	  gains	  touted	  by	  ESOP	  advocates?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Kruse	  (2002)	  24	  Klein,	  Katherine	  J.	  "Employee	  Stock	  Ownership	  and	  Employee	  Attitudes:	  A	  Test	  of	  Three	  Models."	  
Journal	  of	  Applied	  Psychology	  72.2	  (1987):	  319-­‐32.	  Print.	  	  25	  Klein,	  Katherine	  J.,	  and	  Rosalie	  J.	  Hall.	  "Correlates	  of	  Employee	  Satisfaction	  with	  Stock	  Ownership:	  Who	  Likes	  an	  ESOP	  Most?"	  Journal	  of	  Applied	  Psychology	  73.4	  (1988):	  630-­‐38.	  Print.	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   Company	  owners	  who	  choose	  to	  adopt	  an	  ESOP	  will	  have	  done	  so	  for	  one	  of	  many	  reasons.	  	  They	  could	  be	  looking	  to	  defend	  the	  firm	  from	  a	  hostile	  takeover,	  to	  capture	  performance	  benefits,	  to	  negotiate	  wage	  concessions,	  or	  obtain	  the	  tax	  benefits	  to	  prior	  and	  current	  owners.	  	  Regardless	  of	  the	  reason	  behind	  adoption,	  in	  a	  perfectly	  rational	  world,	  the	  management	  of	  the	  companies,	  looking	  after	  the	  company’s	  best	  interest	  should	  attempt	  to	  best	  align	  the	  employee-­‐owner’s	  interests	  with	  the	  company’s	  interest	  in	  pursuit	  of	  efficiency	  and	  quality	  benefits.	  	  	  	   Employee-­‐ownership	  may	  have	  a	  stronger	  effect	  on	  productive	  effects	  if	  its	  employees	  perceive	  the	  ESOP	  as	  a	  good	  thing	  for	  both	  themselves	  and	  the	  company.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  attitude	  of	  employees	  has	  a	  strong	  bearing	  on	  how	  the	  ESOP	  performs.	  	  	  	   The	  task	  of	  aligning	  the	  incentives	  is	  a	  tricky	  one,	  and	  as	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  find	  there	  is	  no	  automatic	  improvement	  in	  attitudes	  just	  from	  being	  an	  employee-­‐owner.	  	  	  According	  to	  Kruse	  most	  studies	  find	  there	  is	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  employee-­‐ownership	  and	  organizational	  commitment	  and	  identification.26	  	  What	  these	  studies	  do	  not	  look	  for	  is	  the	  time	  effect	  that	  time	  involved	  in	  the	  ESOP	  have	  on	  employee	  attitudes.	  This	  brings	  me	  to	  my	  first	  hypothesis:	  	  	  
Hypothesis	  1:	  As	  companies	  grow	  older	  employee-­‐owners	  feel	  a	  stronger	  sense	  of	  identification	  and	  better	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  ESOP.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Kruse	  (2002)	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Over	  time,	  employees	  should	  realize	  that	  on	  average	  their	  retirement	  accounts	  are	  gaining	  value,	  and	  they	  should	  probably	  identify	  more	  and	  more	  with	  being	  an	  employee-­‐owner	  as	  compared	  to	  a	  company	  that	  just	  adopted	  an	  ESOP.	  	  	   One	  caveat	  of	  this	  is	  if	  employees	  are	  being	  provided	  information	  about	  their	  ESOP	  and	  their	  retirement	  account	  they	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  work	  to	  increase	  that	  value.	  	  Furthermore,	  if	  they	  are	  educated	  on	  how	  they	  can	  increase	  this	  value,	  they	  will	  have	  the	  tools	  and	  the	  motive	  to	  do	  so.	  	  If	  they	  aren’t	  provided	  this	  information	  one	  would	  expect	  the	  employees	  to	  continue	  with	  their	  natural	  level	  of	  effort.	  	  This	  brings	  me	  to	  my	  second	  hypothesis:	  	  
Hypothesis	  2:	  When	  employee-­‐owners	  feel	  more	  knowledgeable	  about	  the	  ESOP	  the	  beneficial	  attitude	  effects	  will	  be	  stronger	  positive.	  	  	  My	  third	  hypothesis	  ties	  the	  first	  two	  together.	  	  If	  a	  company	  has	  been	  educating	  its	  workforce	  concerning	  their	  ESOP	  since	  the	  beginning,	  knowledge	  about	  the	  company	  should	  accumulate	  and	  result	  in	  an	  increase	  in	  beneficial	  attitude	  towards	  the	  company.	  	  Second,	  if	  the	  workforce	  sees	  a	  demonstrated	  commitment	  by	  the	  management	  to	  involve,	  educate,	  and	  identify	  with	  the	  workforce	  through	  continued	  ESOP	  education	  employees	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  show	  those	  extra	  performance	  effects	  that	  the	  ESOP	  aims	  to	  accomplish.	  	  	  	  
Hypothesis	  3:	  When	  companies	  engage	  the	  employees	  more	  the	  effect	  on	  attitude	  over	  time	  will	  be	  stronger.	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   Employees	  in	  an	  ESOP	  company	  will	  not	  simply	  react	  in	  a	  favorable	  way	  just	  because	  a	  company	  chooses	  to	  adopt	  an	  ESOP.	  (Kruse,	  2002)	  	  If	  an	  employee	  is	  suddenly	  in	  an	  employee-­‐ownership	  plan,	  his	  or	  her	  future	  compensation	  has	  increased	  but	  at	  no	  immediate	  cost	  to	  the	  employee.	  	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  it	  will	  take	  a	  sense	  of	  engagement	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  company	  for	  employees	  to	  feel	  like	  a	  direct	  owner	  of	  the	  company.	  	  




Data	  and	  Method	  
Data	   This	  study	  examines	  the	  above	  hypotheses	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  companies	  can	  improve	  employee	  attitudes.	  	  The	  data	  being	  used	  is	  survey	  data	  collected	  over	  the	  last	  twenty	  years	  by	  the	  NCEO	  (National	  Center	  for	  Employee-­‐Ownership).	  	  The	  data	  set	  contains	  around	  seventy	  unique	  companies,	  covering	  around	  15,000	  employee	  respondents.	  	  Several	  of	  the	  companies	  have	  elected	  to	  take	  the	  survey	  multiple	  times.	  	  The	  survey	  tracks	  150	  questions	  covering	  areas	  of	  interest	  to	  NCEO’s	  members.	  	  The	  survey	  is	  administered	  online	  in	  order	  to	  get	  the	  highest	  response	  rate	  possible.	  	  	  
ESOP 
Identification Education 
Engagement Belief	  in	  ESOP 
Benefits 
	   Age 
Figure	  1	  :	  Flow	  Chart	  Depicting	  Relationship	  Between	  ESOP	  Benefits	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The	  organization	  of	  the	  survey	  presents	  some	  statistical	  problems	  when	  using	  the	  responses	  as	  data.	  	  	  
Non-­‐Response	  Bias	  /	  Voluntary	  Response	  Bias	  	   The	  data	  may	  also	  suffer	  from	  the	  existence	  of	  voluntary	  response	  bias	  because	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  survey	  data	  was	  collected.	  	  The	  ownership	  culture	  survey	  is	  responded	  to	  by	  ESOPs	  who	  wish	  evaluate	  the	  attitudes	  of	  their	  employees	  and	  compare	  them	  to	  benchmark	  statistics	  of	  other	  companies	  that	  have	  answered	  the	  survey.	  	  	  This	  creates	  two	  problems	  with	  the	  make-­‐up	  of	  companies	  that	  look	  to	  take	  the	  survey.	  	  First,	  companies	  having	  an	  interest	  in	  measuring	  their	  ESOP	  performance	  versus	  that	  of	  other	  companies	  are	  also	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  companies	  that	  are	  invested	  in	  the	  benefits	  of	  ESOPs.	  	  ESOP	  companies	  that	  have	  little	  interest	  in	  realizing	  the	  theoretical	  benefits	  of	  an	  ESOP	  will	  have	  little	  interest	  in	  measuring	  their	  performance	  versus	  other	  ESOPs	  and	  they	  are,	  theoretically,	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  poorest	  performing	  ESOPs.	  	  Therefore,	  companies	  that	  have	  performed	  poorly	  after	  adopting	  an	  ESOP	  may	  be	  underrepresented.	  	  	  Second,	  because	  the	  ownership	  culture	  survey	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  NCEO	  for	  a	  fee,	  companies	  that	  are	  not	  as	  invested	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  ESOP	  may	  not	  respond	  and	  will	  be	  omitted	  from	  the	  dataset.	  Because	  of	  this	  we	  must	  take	  note	  that	  while	  the	  least	  organized	  of	  the	  ESOPs	  are	  left	  out,	  we	  believe	  that	  our	  dataset	  can	  still	  represent	  a	  spectrum	  of	  companies	  which	  may	  be	  more	  invested	  in	  the	  ESOP	  idea	  than	  a	  random	  selection	  of	  ESOPs.	  	   The	  data	  also	  suffers	  on	  another	  level	  because	  not	  all	  companies	  respond	  to	  every	  question.	  	  This	  limited	  the	  amount	  of	  usable	  data	  in	  the	  dataset	  when	  creating	  indices	  for	  questions	  measuring	  the	  different	  aspects	  of	  employee	  attitude.	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Age	  of	  companies	  	   The	  original	  dataset	  provided	  by	  the	  NCEO	  did	  not	  include	  a	  variable	  measuring	  how	  long	  the	  company	  had	  been	  an	  ESOP	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  report	  date.	  	  However,	  the	  dataset	  did	  include	  a	  variable	  for	  report	  date.	  	  To	  capture	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  the	  company	  has	  been	  an	  ESOP,	  I	  used	  the	  form	  5500s	  publically	  available	  on	  the	  department	  of	  labor	  website27	  and	  merged	  it	  with	  the	  NCEO	  dataset	  by	  the	  company	  name.	  	  I	  extracted	  the	  date	  of	  plan	  inception	  from	  the	  5500’s	  and	  computed	  the	  time	  that	  elapsed	  from	  inception	  to	  the	  date	  the	  company	  took	  the	  survey.	  	  	  	   Figure	  2	  shows	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  ages	  of	  the	  companies	  used	  in	  the	  dataset.	  	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  companies	  lie	  in	  the	  range	  from	  zero	  to	  ten	  years,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  good	  amount	  from	  10	  to	  20	  years	  old,	  and	  then	  there	  a	  few	  outliers	  older	  than	  25	  years.	  	  This	  skewed	  distribution	  could	  be	  a	  result	  of	  a	  few	  things.	  	  First,	  companies	  could	  be	  dropping	  out	  of	  the	  dataset	  as	  they	  get	  older.	  	  Second,	  the	  majority	  of	  companies	  that	  adopted	  ESOPS	  adopted	  them	  in	  the	  1990’s	  and	  2000’s,	  since	  the	  data	  has	  been	  collected	  over	  the	  past	  20	  years	  the	  majority	  of	  companies	  that	  did	  the	  survey	  were	  probably	  from	  zero	  to	  ten	  years	  old.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27"Form	  5500	  Series."	  Annual	  Return/Report	  5500	  Series	  Forms	  and	  Instructions.	  N.p.,	  n.d.	  Web.	  03	  May	  2013.	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  Figure	  2,	  3:	  Age	  of	  employee-­‐owned	  companies	  in	  dataset	  (Left);	  distribution	  of	  report	  date	  in	  dataset	  (Right)	  
	   	  Figure	  4,	  5:	  Number	  of	  total	  employee-­‐owned	  companies	  by	  year	  (Left)28;	  dataset	  density	  of	  the	  inception	  years	  of	  companies	  in	  dataset.	  	   To	  explain	  the	  skewedness	  of	  the	  timespan	  variable	  we	  look	  at	  the	  number	  of	  ESOP	  companies	  by	  year	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  ESOP	  adoption	  date	  in	  the	  dataset.	  	  The	  combination	  of	  these	  shows	  that	  it	  is	  not	  unnatural	  to	  have	  a	  large	  density	  of	  data	  on	  plans	  starting	  from	  1993	  to	  2007	  because	  of	  a	  combination	  of	  two	  factors,	  growth	  of	  employee-­‐ownership	  plans	  at	  that	  time	  and	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  survey.	  	  The	  survey’s	  first	  respondent	  was	  in	  1993,	  and	  in	  the	  timespan	  from	  1993	  to	  2012	  the	  largest	  period	  of	  growth	  of	  ESOPs	  was	  from	  1993	  to	  2000.	  	  As	  seen	  in	  Figure	  5,	  the	  highest	  density	  of	  ESOP	  adoptions	  occurred	  during	  the	  time	  largest	  period	  of	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growth	  of	  adoptions	  was	  observed	  while	  the	  survey	  was	  available.	  	  	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  accounting	  for	  the	  limited	  existence	  of	  the	  survey,	  the	  skewedness	  of	  the	  timespan	  variable	  is	  not	  unnatural.	  	  	  
Method	  
Timespan	  Variable	  	   The	  logarithmic	  function	  of	  the	  timespan	  variable	  seemed	  to	  have	  a	  better	  fit	  than	  the	  original	  timespan	  variable.	  	  It	  makes	  sense	  that	  the	  logarithmic	  function	  would	  be	  more	  appropriate	  for	  the	  data	  because	  increases	  in	  employee	  attitudes	  are	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  constant	  between	  early	  and	  late	  years.	  	  	  Between	  its	  first	  and	  second	  years	  of	  being	  an	  ESOP	  a	  company	  might	  be	  expected	  to	  show	  a	  larger	  effect	  increase	  in	  attitudes	  than	  a	  company	  surveyed	  between	  its	  nineteenth	  and	  twentieth	  year.	  	  	  This	  is	  seen	  most	  clearly	  when	  looking	  at	  a	  scatter	  plot	  between	  the	  education	  proxy	  and	  the	  age	  of	  companies	  shown	  in	  Figure	  6.	  	  In	  the	  first	  couple	  years	  you	  would	  probably	  have	  more	  variability,	  where	  it	  may	  take	  companies	  longer	  to	  bring	  out	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  ESOP,	  however	  in	  the	  later	  years	  there	  shouldn’t	  be	  much	  year	  to	  year	  difference.	  	  Also	  since	  the	  survey	  data	  is	  upper-­‐bound,	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  asymptotic	  relationship	  is	  extremely	  likely.	  	  
Figure	  6:	  Effect	  of	  the	  age	  of	  the	  company	  on	  all	  questions	  under	  topic	  ESOP	  Understanding	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Category	  Groupings	  	   To	  create	  a	  proxy	  for	  each	  of	  the	  attitude	  test	  variables,	  an	  index	  was	  created	  to	  generate	  an	  average	  for	  the	  level	  of	  identification,	  belief,	  education,	  and	  engagement	  felt	  within	  the	  sample.	  	  Four	  questions	  were	  chosen	  from	  each	  category	  and	  the	  scores	  of	  each	  were	  added	  together	  to	  create	  a	  composite	  score	  for	  the	  index.	  	  Companies	  that	  did	  not	  answer	  all	  four	  of	  the	  questions	  could	  not	  be	  included	  in	  the	  index	  because	  if	  a	  company	  had	  not	  answered	  all	  the	  questions	  the	  composite	  score	  would	  be	  undervalued.	  	  This	  problem	  limited	  the	  number	  of	  questions	  that	  could	  comprise	  each	  proxy	  because	  of	  the	  pigeon-­‐hole	  effect.	  	  	  	   Sample	  size	  is	  therefore	  driven	  down	  because	  the	  size	  of	  each	  index	  sample	  cannot	  exceed	  the	  number	  of	  respondents	  for	  the	  least	  answered	  question.	  	  Figure	  7	  shows	  the	  four	  indices	  and	  the	  questions	  that	  make	  up	  each	  index.	  	  	   Each	  of	  the	  indices	  was	  created	  to	  best	  represent	  a	  different	  aspect	  of	  employee	  attitudes	  in	  ESOP	  companies.	  	  The	  Identification	  and	  Belief	  variables	  serve	  to	  measure	  the	  employees	  view	  of	  the	  company	  and	  employee	  attitudes;	  while	  the	  Education	  and	  Engagement	  variables	  which	  try	  to	  capture	  the	  effort	  given	  by	  the	  company	  to	  encourage	  the	  ESOP.	  	  	  The	  questions	  making	  up	  the	  index	  for	  employee	  identification	  were	  chosen	  based	  on	  employees’	  personal	  feelings	  about	  their	  ties	  to	  the	  company	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  employee-­‐ownership	  to	  the	  employees.	  	  The	  questions	  comprising	  the	  index	  for	  belief	  were	  chosen	  based	  on	  based	  on	  employees’	  general	  investment	  in	  the	  company	  and	  more	  generally	  questions	  that	  could	  represent	  attitudes	  most	  easily	  leading	  to	  a	  more	  productive	  and	  profitable	  workplace.	  	  The	  education	  index	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was	  made	  up	  of	  questions	  that	  aimed	  to	  capture	  how	  well	  the	  employees	  understood	  the	  ESOP	  and	  how	  well	  the	  company	  shares	  information	  with	  the	  employees.	  	  Lastly,	  the	  engagement	  index	  aimed	  to	  capture	  employee	  involvement	  in	  company	  decisions.	  	  The	  creation	  of	  these	  four	  indices	  gives	  us	  the	  ability	  to	  look	  at	  the	  effect	  that	  each	  aspect	  of	  employee-­‐ownership	  has	  on	  employee	  attitudes.	  	  	   	  
	  Figure	  7:	  Questions	  making	  up	  each	  of	  the	  four	  indices	  Identification,	  Belief,	  Education,	  and	  Engagement	  Independent	  variables	  are	  highlighted	  
Industry	  Normality	  	   After	  making	  the	  four	  composite	  question	  groups,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  verify	  that	  the	  industry	  makeup	  of	  the	  four	  proxy	  groups	  was	  approximately	  the	  same	  as	  the	  full	  data	  set.	  	  The	  form	  5500	  provided	  us	  with	  a	  variable	  for	  the	  NAICS	  (North	  American	  Industry	  Classification	  System),	  using	  this,	  the	  companies	  in	  the	  dataset	  were	  grouped	  into	  industry	  classes:	  
Category Survey	  Question
How	  much	  do	  you	  feel	  like	  an	  owner	  of	  the	  company
How	  much	  do	  other	  people	  here	  feel	  like	  owners	  
How	  important	  is	  ownerhip	  to	  you?	  
OurCo	  employees	  feel	  it	  is	  important	  to	  know	  how	  [their	  workgroup]	  affects	  the	  bottom	  line.
People	  at	  [OurCo]	  care	  about	  meeting	  our	  customers’	  needs	  
Employees	  at	  [OurCo]	  are	  very	  committed	  to	  the	  company	  and	  its	  future
People	  recognize	  the	  future	  value	  of	  their	  ESOP	  account	  depends	  on	  the	  success	  of	  the	  company
People	  at	  [OurCo]	  work	  hard
The	  company	  makes	  a	  sincere	  effort	  to	  share	  information	  with	  employees	  
People	  at	  OurCo	  are	  given	  enough	  information	  about	  their	  performance	  to	  do	  their	  jobs	  well	  
I	  get	  sufficient	  feedback	  about	  my	  work	  to	  improve	  my	  performance	  
Generally	  speaking,	  I	  understand	  the	  ESOP	  idea	  and	  how	  it	  works	  at	  this	  company
This	  company	  encourages	  people	  to	  participate	  in	  decisions	  that	  affect	  their	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  work	  
Employees	  at	  [OurCo]	  have	  real	  influence	  over	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  company
I	  actively	  contribute	  to	  group	  problem-­‐solving	  efforts	  in	  my	  work	  area






	  	   21–23:	  	   Mining,	  Quarrying,	  and	  Oil	  and	  Gas	  Extraction	  /	  Utilities/	  Construction	  	   31-­‐33:	  	   Manufacturing	  	   42:	  	   Wholesale	  Trade	  	   44-­‐45:	   Retail	  Trade	  	   48-­‐49:	   Transportation	  and	  Warehousing	  	   51:	   Information	  	   52:	   Finance	  and	  Insurance	  	   53:	   Real	  Estate	  and	  Rental	  and	  Leasing	  	   54:	   Professional	  and	  Technical	  Services29	  	  	   A	  paired	  t-­‐test	  (Appendix	  2.2)	  was	  performed	  comparing	  the	  distribution	  of	  industries	  between	  the	  various	  indices	  and	  the	  original	  dataset.	  	  It	  revealed	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  evidence	  that	  the	  make-­‐up	  of	  the	  industries	  was	  any	  different	  before	  and	  after	  the	  proxies	  were	  created.	  	  
Within	  Company	  Tests	  	   Seven	  of	  the	  companies	  in	  the	  dataset	  have	  responded	  to	  the	  survey	  more	  than	  once	  at	  different	  times.	  	  To	  visualize	  the	  effect	  age	  has	  on	  each	  of	  the	  determinants	  of	  employee-­‐ownership	  I’ve	  created	  four	  plots	  and	  trend	  lines	  mapping	  each	  of	  the	  companies	  average	  scores	  for	  the	  indices	  over	  time.	  	  Though	  the	  sample	  size	  is	  small,	  the	  evidence	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  illuminating	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  time	  on	  employee	  attitudes	  in	  ESOP	  companies.	  	  	  
Regression	  Equations	  	   In	  the	  first	  regression,	  we	  test	  the	  first	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  age	  of	  a	  company	  has	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  belief	  employees	  have	  in	  the	  company	  and	  identification	  they	  feel	  toward	  the	  company.	  	  The	  Number	  of	  employees	  is	  also	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Industry	  codes	  taken	  from	  NAICS	  database	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included	  in	  the	  regression	  because	  findings	  in	  previous	  literature	  indicate	  that	  the	  number	  of	  employees	  has	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  attitudes.	  (Appendix	  1.1,1.2)	  (1) Belief	  =	  B0	  +	  B1	  [ln(timespan)]	  +	  B2(Employment)	  +	  ε	  (2) Identification	  =	  B0	  +	  B1	  [ln(timespan)]	  +	  B2(Employment)	  +	  ε	  	  The	  second	  hypothesis	  aims	  to	  find	  a	  link	  between	  the	  information	  transfer	  about	  the	  ESOP	  between	  management	  and	  employees	  (education	  variable)	  and	  the	  belief	  the	  employees	  have	  in	  the	  company.	  	  Regression	  (4)	  (Appendix	  1.4)	  is	  run	  to	  see	  if	  employees,	  as	  the	  company	  gets	  older,	  will	  feel	  like	  they	  know	  more	  about	  the	  ESOP.	  	  Regression	  (3)	  (Appendix	  1.3)	  runs	  education,	  timespan,	  and	  population	  against	  belief.	  	   (3) Education	  =	  B0	  +	  B1	  [ln(timespan)]	  +	  B2(Employment)	  +	  ε	  	  (4) Belief	  =	  B0	  +	  B1	  Education	  +	  B2	  [ln(timespan)]	  +	  B3(Employment)	  +	  ε	  
	  The	  third	  hypothesis	  looks	  at	  the	  effect	  engagement	  has	  on	  employees’	  belief	  in	  the	  ESOP.	  	  Regression	  (5)	  (Appendix	  1.5)	  runs	  engagement,	  timespan,	  and	  employment	  against	  belief.	  	  	  (5) Belief	  =	  B0	  +	  B1	  Engagement	  +	  B2	  [ln(timespan)]	  +	  B3(Employment)	  +	  ε	  
	   The	  last	  hypothesis	  is	  tested	  by	  examining	  the	  effect	  on	  belief	  when	  both	  variables	  are	  included	  in	  the	  regression.	  	  Regression	  (6)	  (Appendix	  1.6)	  runs	  engagement,	  education,	  timespan,	  and	  employment	  against	  belief.	  (6) Belief	  =	  B0	  +	  B1	  Education	  +	  B2	  Engagement	  +	  B3	  [ln(timespan)]	  +	  B4(Employment)	  +	  ε	  
Results	  	   The	  first	  two	  regressions	  (Appendix	  1.1,	  1.2)	  aim	  to	  find	  a	  link	  between	  the	  age	  of	  companies	  and	  employee	  attitudes.	  	  These	  two	  regressions	  failed	  some	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  Figures	  8	  -­‐	  11:	  Age	  Effect	  on	  ID(Top	  Left,	  8),	  Belief	  (Top	  Right,	  9),	  Education	  (Bottom	  Left,	  10),	  Engagement(Bottom	  Right,	  11)	  	   The	  fourth	  regression	  run	  did	  not	  fail	  any	  of	  the	  regression	  assumptions.	  	  It	  maintained	  linearity,	  had	  relatively	  normally	  distributed	  errors,	  and	  the	  errors	  passed	  the	  test	  for	  homoscedasticity.	  	  With	  an	  R2	  of	  .5569,	  the	  fit	  was	  good.	  	  Figure	  12	  shows	  the	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Figure	  12:	  Linear	  prediction	  of	  model	  (4)	  Education	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable	  belief	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   The	  fifth	  regression	  examined	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  employee’s	  belief	  in	  the	  company	  and	  the	  employee’s	  engagement	  in	  the	  firm.	  	  Of	  the	  previous	  four	  regressions	  this	  had	  the	  strongest	  fit.	  	  The	  R2	  value	  revealed	  that	  the	  fit	  covered	  around	  77%	  of	  the	  data	  and	  the	  variables	  for	  all	  engagement,	  timespan,	  and	  employment	  all	  were	  statistically	  significant.	  	  The	  coefficient	  for	  engagement	  from	  the	  regression	  was	  .922	  implying	  that	  a	  one	  unit	  change	  in	  the	  composite	  score	  of	  engagement	  would	  result	  in	  a	  1	  point	  increase	  in	  the	  employees	  belief	  in	  the	  company.	  	  Timespan	  also	  played	  a	  role	  where	  a	  one	  percent	  increase	  in	  the	  timespan	  variable	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  .39	  point	  increase	  in	  employee	  belief.	  	  While	  statistically	  significant,	  the	  coefficient	  for	  employment	  was	  extremely	  small,	  where	  even	  a	  one	  thousand	  person	  change	  in	  employment	  would	  have	  only	  yielded	  a	  .9	  point	  decrease	  in	  employee’s	  belief	  in	  the	  company.	  	   The	  last	  regression	  (Appendix	  (1.6)	  sought	  to	  distinguish	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  
education	  variable	  and	  the	  engagement	  variable.	  	  We	  found	  that	  when	  run	  together,	  education	  was	  not	  a	  significant	  predictor	  of	  belief,	  while	  engagement	  was.	  Though	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Figure	  14:	  Linear	  prediction	  of	  Engagement	  and	  Education	  model(6)	  on	  Belief	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the	  engagement	  variable	  lost	  some	  significance	  due	  to	  multi-­‐collinearity,	  it	  still	  was	  significant	  at	  the	  1%	  level.	  	  The	  model	  had	  an	  R2	  of	  .7755	  and	  was	  significant	  compared	  to	  a	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  relationship.	  	  Figure	  9	  shows	  the	  fit	  of	  the	  model	  on	  the	  actual	  variable	  belief,	  as	  it	  shows	  the	  linearity	  assumption	  holds.	  	  	  
Discussion	  &	  Conclusion	  
	  	   The	  available	  dataset	  had	  some	  inevitable	  flaws	  due	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  was	  collected.	  	  These	  flaws	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  draw	  significant	  conclusions.	  	  Despite	  the	  voluntary	  response	  bias	  that	  results	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  dataset	  contains	  data	  only	  for	  companies	  that	  choose	  to	  participate,	  the	  data	  contained	  a	  good	  distribution	  of	  scores	  to	  draw	  conclusions.	  	  The	  dataset	  also	  suffered	  from	  a	  combination	  of	  a	  relatively	  small	  sample	  size	  and	  a	  further	  reduction	  in	  sample	  size	  coming	  from	  the	  creation	  of	  category	  indices	  thus	  limiting	  the	  significance	  we	  could	  capture	  from	  the	  regressions	  and	  taking	  away	  the	  opportunity	  to	  do	  analysis	  between	  different	  industries.	  	  Lastly,	  since	  we	  were	  comparing	  the	  survey	  to	  itself	  the	  indices	  taken	  together	  suffered	  from	  multi-­‐collinearity	  (Appendix	  2.1)	  because	  all	  of	  the	  categories	  were	  and	  should	  be	  interconnected	  to	  result	  in	  a	  highly	  functioning	  ESOP.	  	  This	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  compare	  the	  different	  indices	  to	  find	  the	  effect	  of	  each	  while	  controlling	  for	  the	  others.	  	  
Age	  Effect	  	   Despite	  the	  shortfalls	  of	  the	  data,	  some	  of	  the	  results	  proved	  to	  be	  interesting.	  	  According	  to	  the	  regressions,	  the	  age	  of	  an	  ESOP	  does	  not	  seem	  to	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automatically	  strengthen	  attitudes	  in	  the	  workforce.	  	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  previous	  research	  saying	  that	  an	  ESOP	  is	  not	  a	  source	  of	  automatic	  improvement	  in	  employee	  attitudes.	  	  It	  makes	  sense	  that	  the	  age	  of	  the	  company	  does	  not	  alone	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  employee	  attitudes	  because	  if	  the	  employees	  have	  not	  personally	  seen	  a	  demonstrated	  effort	  by	  management	  toward	  the	  ESOP	  they	  may	  not	  feel	  like	  owners	  thus	  have	  no	  emotional	  investment	  in	  the	  firm.	  	  	   Even	  though	  the	  regressions	  show	  no	  significant	  effect	  of	  age,	  when	  looking	  at	  individual	  companies	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  overwhelming	  positive	  trend	  in	  composite	  scores	  as	  companies	  get	  older.	  	  Only	  one	  company	  in	  one	  of	  the	  plots	  (engagement)	  yielded	  a	  negative	  relationship	  between	  age	  and	  the	  composite	  score	  for	  engagement;	  otherwise	  every	  drawn	  relationship	  between	  age	  and	  score	  was	  positive.	  	  	  	   A	  few	  things	  jumped	  out	  looking	  at	  the	  plots	  in	  figures	  8	  –	  11	  (p.	  29).	  	  First,	  it	  helps	  understand	  why	  the	  regressions	  as	  a	  whole	  were	  not	  significant.	  	  Looking	  back	  at	  figure	  8	  which	  shows	  the	  relationship	  between	  ID	  and	  Age,	  we	  see	  two	  companies	  (starting	  between	  ages	  18	  and	  20)	  having	  lower	  scores	  at	  their	  first	  data	  point	  than	  the	  top	  company	  (starting	  at	  age	  1)	  but	  still	  show	  increasing	  trends.	  	  All	  three	  of	  the	  companies	  showed	  increasing	  scores	  after	  taking	  the	  survey.	  	  This	  says	  a	  few	  things,	  abstracting	  from	  the	  fact	  the	  companies	  voluntarily	  take	  the	  survey.	  	  By	  taking	  the	  survey,	  a	  company	  demonstrates	  a	  voluntary	  effort	  to	  evaluate	  the	  employee	  attitudes	  in	  its	  company.	  	  A	  second	  action	  to	  take	  the	  survey	  demonstrates	  a	  company’s	  continuing	  investment	  in	  efforts.	  	  Since	  we	  see	  increasing	  scores,	  we	  can	  draw	  a	  strong	  hypothesis	  that	  companies	  age	  in	  conjunction	  with	  company	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dedication	  to	  the	  ESOP	  results	  in	  increasing	  scores.	  	  Findings	  by	  Pendleton	  et.	  al	  (1998)	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  employee	  participation	  is	  critical	  in	  increasing	  employee	  efforts.30	  	  It	  also	  shows	  that	  taking	  all	  the	  companies	  together	  will	  most	  likely	  yield	  insignificant	  results	  because	  they	  will	  all	  most	  likely	  have	  different	  starting	  values.	  	  These	  plots	  reveal	  that	  there	  could	  in	  fact	  be	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  age	  of	  a	  company	  and	  the	  levels	  of	  engagement,	  identification,	  belief,	  and	  education.	  	  A	  more	  exhaustive	  panel	  data	  set	  would	  be	  required	  to	  truly	  determine	  this.	  	  
Number	  of	  Employees	  	   Across	  all	  of	  the	  regressions	  run	  was	  a	  common	  negative	  impact	  in	  employee	  attitudes	  as	  the	  number	  of	  employees	  in	  the	  company	  increased.	  	  This	  makes	  sense	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  study	  because	  as	  a	  company	  gets	  bigger	  each	  person	  will	  have	  less	  influence	  and	  probably	  identify	  less	  as	  an	  owner	  of	  the	  company	  of	  the	  company.	  	  For	  a	  bigger	  company	  it	  would	  also	  be	  more	  difficult	  to	  educate	  all	  of	  the	  employees	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  ESOP.	  	  These	  findings	  are	  consistent	  with	  other	  studies	  finding	  number	  of	  employees	  being	  a	  significant	  negative	  factor	  in	  employee-­‐owned	  companies.	  	  The	  larger	  is	  a	  company,	  the	  less	  able	  it	  is	  to	  capture	  the	  benefits	  of	  employee-­‐ownership.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Pendleton,	  Andrew,	  Nicholas	  Wilson,	  and	  Mike	  Wright.	  "The	  Perception	  and	  Effects	  of	  Share	  Ownership:	  Empirical	  Evidence	  from	  Employee	  Buy-­‐Outs."	  British	  Journal	  of	  Industrial	  Relations	  36.1	  (1998):	  99-­‐123.	  Print.	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Education	  Effect	  	   The	  second	  hypothesis	  aimed	  to	  draw	  a	  connection	  between	  the	  companies’	  effort	  to	  educate	  and	  inform	  employees	  about	  the	  ESOP	  and	  beneficial	  attitudes	  resulting	  from	  it.	  	  Based	  on	  our	  results,	  education	  seemed	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  employee’s	  belief	  in	  the	  company.	  	  
Engagement	  Effect	  	   The	  third	  hypothesis	  looked	  to	  draw	  a	  connection	  between	  the	  engagement	  of	  employees	  and	  the	  employees’	  belief	  in	  the	  company.	  	  This	  hypothesis	  was	  strongly	  supported	  by	  the	  evidence.	  	  The	  data	  exhibited	  close	  to	  a	  1-­‐to-­‐1	  relationship	  between	  engagement	  and	  belief	  from	  which	  we	  conclude	  that	  employee	  engagement	  is	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  strengthening	  of	  a	  workforce.	  	  Once	  again,	  the	  regression	  still	  suffered	  the	  same	  problem	  the	  regression	  between	  belief	  and	  education	  suffered	  from.	  	  
Full	  Regression	  	   In	  the	  full	  regression	  the	  education	  variable	  became	  insignificant.	  	  	  Interestingly,	  an	  F-­‐test	  reveals	  that	  at	  any	  level	  of	  significance,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  education	  variable	  does	  not	  significantly	  affect	  the	  regression,	  but	  the	  engagement	  variable	  is	  vital.	  	  From	  this	  we	  believe	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  engagement	  of	  employee-­‐owners	  is	  a	  very	  critical	  part	  in	  affecting	  the	  attitudes	  of	  the	  workforce	  and	  thereby,	  as	  an	  assumption,	  their	  given	  effort	  and	  productivity.	  	   I	  conclude	  this	  study	  by	  asserting	  that	  the	  most	  important	  determinants	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  employee-­‐ownership	  come	  from	  the	  demonstrated	  effort	  of	  the	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company	  to	  the	  ESOP.	  	  We	  see	  from	  the	  example	  of	  NewAge	  Industries	  the	  amount	  of	  effort	  and	  resources	  the	  company	  uses	  to	  encourage	  the	  workforce	  in	  the	  ESOP.	  	  Through	  the	  different	  programs	  and	  established	  workforce	  community	  the	  company	  has	  surpassed	  its	  industry	  competitors.	  	  Though	  it	  is	  one	  example,	  it	  is	  a	  telling	  story	  of	  the	  potential	  benefits	  of	  shared	  capitalism.	  From	  the	  culmination	  of	  the	  study	  and	  research	  into	  NewAge	  Industries	  we	  can	  draw	  two	  conclusions.	  	  First,	  if	  employees	  feel	  engaged	  in	  decisions,	  engaged	  in	  the	  company,	  and	  have	  the	  perception	  that	  they	  are	  in	  fact	  influencing	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  company	  they	  will	  in	  turn	  give	  more	  effort	  to	  the	  company.	  	  Second,	  employees	  will	  respond	  to	  a	  demonstrated	  effort	  to	  the	  ESOP	  by	  the	  management.	  	  The	  plots	  tracking	  companies	  that	  responded	  more	  than	  once	  all	  show	  that	  after	  the	  company	  demonstrates	  an	  initial	  effort,	  represented	  by	  the	  willingness	  to	  evaluate	  employee	  efforts,	  an	  increase	  in	  employee	  attitudes	  on	  average	  is	  observed.	  	  Though	  the	  sample	  size	  is	  small	  and	  difficult	  to	  quantify,	  the	  plots	  reveal	  an	  undeniable	  upward	  trend	  in	  efforts	  following	  the	  participation	  in	  the	  survey.	  Overall,	  we	  see	  employee-­‐ownership	  while	  not	  a	  fix	  all	  solution	  to	  every	  companies’	  problems	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  expand	  the	  capacities	  of	  human	  capital.	  	   	  
Further	  Study	  
	  	   The	  available	  data	  for	  employee	  attitudes	  used	  in	  this	  study	  was	  not	  perfect	  for	  conducting	  this	  kind	  of	  study.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  collection	  method,	  meant	  as	  a	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service	  offered	  to	  employee-­‐owned	  companies	  rather	  than	  a	  randomly	  sampled	  dataset,	  the	  dataset	  suffered	  from	  a	  number	  of	  unavoidable	  statistical	  problems.	  	  That	  being	  said,	  I	  do	  believe	  this	  study	  provides	  insight	  that	  would	  warrant	  future	  research	  on	  the	  ways	  employee-­‐owned	  companies	  can	  capture	  the	  bountiful	  set	  of	  beneficial	  aspects	  made	  available	  by	  employee-­‐ownership.	  	   	  Two	  main	  components	  of	  the	  data	  set	  limited	  the	  potential	  for	  the	  dataset.	  	  First,	  the	  sample	  size	  of	  about	  90	  companies	  was	  smaller	  than	  would	  be	  ideal	  but	  still	  big	  enough	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  from.	  	  Second,	  because	  not	  all	  companies	  responded	  to	  every	  question,	  the	  process	  of	  creating	  the	  component	  proxies	  eliminated	  about	  one	  third	  of	  the	  dataset.	  	  This	  caused	  a	  few	  problems:	  it	  limited	  my	  ability	  to	  choose	  questions	  that	  most	  accurately	  reflected	  the	  proxy,	  it	  limited	  the	  companies	  in	  the	  proxies	  to	  the	  ones	  that	  answered	  all	  four	  proxy	  questions,	  and	  it	  made	  comparisons	  between	  industries	  impossible.	  	  	  	   A	  further	  problem	  I	  ran	  into	  when	  attempting	  to	  find	  data	  with	  which	  to	  analyze	  my	  hypotheses	  was	  the	  impossibility	  of	  gathering	  a	  group	  of	  matched	  firms	  some	  of	  which	  are	  ESOPs	  and	  others	  of	  which	  are	  not.	  	  An	  interesting	  extension	  of	  this	  study,	  were	  such	  ideal	  data	  to	  be	  available,	  would	  be	  to	  compare	  how	  similar	  engagement	  and	  education	  parameters	  affect	  employees’	  perception	  of	  the	  company	  in	  ESOP	  and	  non-­‐ESOP	  companies.	  	  This	  would	  also	  provide	  us	  with	  a	  list	  of	  control	  group	  companies.	  	  The	  index	  used	  for	  belief,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  question	  surrounding	  employees’	  belief	  in	  employee-­‐ownership,	  would	  be	  able	  to	  be	  used	  in	  non-­‐ESOP	  companies.	  	  With	  this	  we	  could	  start	  to	  examine	  some	  of	  the	  fundamental	  differences	  between	  ESOP	  and	  non-­‐ESOP	  firms.	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   Lastly,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  financial	  data	  could	  add	  a	  new	  dimension	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  translate	  employees’	  perception	  into	  productivity	  and	  growth.	  	  This	  would	  provide	  us	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  find	  the	  driving	  mechanisms	  behind	  productivity	  instead	  of	  the	  assumption	  that	  if	  an	  employee	  believes	  that	  people	  work	  hard	  such	  belief	  would	  translate	  into	  productivity.	  	  	  	   This	  study	  provides	  some	  framework	  for	  future	  study	  in	  the	  field	  of	  employee-­‐ownership.	  	  Though	  more	  exhaustive	  and	  expensive	  data	  collection	  is	  needed,	  it	  could	  provide	  some	  insight	  into	  the	  ways	  ESOP	  companies	  can	  unleash	  their	  potential,	  and	  where	  ESOP	  companies	  thrive.	  	  	  	  	   	  
42	  	  
	  
Appendix	  1	  1.1	  –	  Belief	  =	  B0	  +	  B1	  [ln(timespan)]	  +	  B2(Employment)	  +	  ε	  
	  1.2	  -­‐	  Identification	  =	  B0	  +	  B1	  [ln(timespan)]	  +	  B2(Employment)	  +	  ε	  
	  1.3	  -­‐	  Education	  =	  B0	  +	  B1	  [ln(timespan)]	  +	  B2(Employment)	  +	  ε	  
	  	   	  
                                                                              
       _cons     26.11533   1.125124    23.21   0.000     23.83121    28.39946
  employment    -.0026191    .000911    -2.88   0.007    -.0044685   -.0007697
  lntimespan    -.4415338   .4921767    -0.90   0.376    -1.440706    .5576381
                                                                              
          ID        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    421.122531    37    11.38169           Root MSE      =  3.1098
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1503
    Residual    338.488861    35   9.6711103           R-squared     =  0.1962
       Model      82.63367     2   41.316835           Prob > F      =  0.0219
                                                       F(  2,    35) =    4.27
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      38
                                                                              
       _cons     22.39032   .7444313    30.08   0.000     20.85035    23.93029
  employment     -.001235   .0007496    -1.65   0.113    -.0027856    .0003156
  lntimespan     .3708594   .2982181     1.24   0.226    -.2460519    .9877706
                                                                              
      Belief        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    65.8908102    25  2.63563241           Root MSE      =  1.5318
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1097
    Residual    53.9690228    23  2.34647925           R-squared     =  0.1809
       Model    11.9217874     2  5.96089371           Prob > F      =  0.1007
                                                       F(  2,    23) =    2.54
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      26
                                                                              
       _cons     18.38866   .7432224    24.74   0.000     16.86095    19.91638
  employment    -.0007838   .0005089    -1.54   0.136    -.0018298    .0002622
  lntimespan     .5447454    .303415     1.80   0.084    -.0789331    1.168424
                                                                              
   Education        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    92.5732003    28  3.30618573           Root MSE      =  1.6798
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1465
    Residual    73.3645337    26  2.82171284           R-squared     =  0.2075
       Model    19.2086666     2  9.60433329           Prob > F      =  0.0486
                                                       F(  2,    26) =    3.40
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      29
43	  	  
1.4	  -­‐	  Belief	  =	  B0	  +	  B1	  Education	  +	  B2	  [ln(timespan)]	  +	  B3(Employment)	  +	  ε	  
	  1.5	  -­‐	  Belief	  =	  B0	  +	  B1	  Engagement	  +	  B2	  [ln(timespan)]	  +	  B3(Employment)	  +	  ε
	  	   	  
                                                                              
       _cons     10.81993   1.852203     5.84   0.000     7.095829    14.54404
  employment    -.0014855   .0003837    -3.87   0.000    -.0022569   -.0007141
  lntimespan    -.0634014   .1663839    -0.38   0.705    -.3979387    .2711358
   Education     .6531999   .1023524     6.38   0.000     .4474066    .8589933
                                                                              
      Belief        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     131.78162    51  2.58395334           Root MSE      =   1.103
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.5292
    Residual    58.3920616    48  1.21650128           R-squared     =  0.5569
       Model    73.3895588     3  24.4631863           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,    48) =   20.11
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      52
                                                                              
       _cons     3.978447   1.740044     2.29   0.027     .4716187    7.485276
  employment    -.0009168   .0002869    -3.20   0.003    -.0014949   -.0003387
  lntimespan      .390695   .1134611     3.44   0.001     .1620292    .6193609
  Engagement     .9215391   .0859209    10.73   0.000     .7483769    1.094701
                                                                              
      Belief        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    130.353456    47   2.7734778           Root MSE      =  .81724
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7592
    Residual    29.3870259    44  .667886953           R-squared     =  0.7746
       Model    100.966431     3  33.6554768           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  3,    44) =   50.39
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      48
44	  	  
1.6	  –	  Belief	  =	  B0	  +	  B1	  Education	  +	  B2	  Engagement	  +	  B3	  [ln(timespan)]	  +	  B4(Employment)	  +	  ε	  
	  
Appendix	  2	  2.1	  Multi-­‐Collinearity	  between	  Coefficients	  	  
	  2.2	  Paired	  T-­‐Tests	  of	  Total	  vs.	  Index	  Industry	  Distributions	  	  
	  
                                                                              
       _cons     3.918434   1.411866     2.78   0.007     1.100336    6.736531
  employment    -.0008805   .0002421    -3.64   0.001    -.0013637   -.0003973
  lntimespan     .4289893    .117294     3.66   0.001     .1948695    .6631092
  Engagement     .9772428   .1269788     7.70   0.000     .7237921    1.230693
   Education    -.0592826   .1131076    -0.52   0.602    -.2850464    .1664811
                                                                              
      Belief        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    195.530185    71  2.75394626           Root MSE      =  .80946
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.7621
    Residual    43.9005413    67   .65523196           R-squared     =  0.7755
       Model    151.629643     4  37.9074108           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,    67) =   57.85
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      72
  employment    -0.0980  -0.3726  -0.0303  -0.2194  -0.2149   1.0000
  lntimespan     0.0073   0.2846   0.3353   0.2392   1.0000
          ID     0.7181   0.8208   0.6934   1.0000
   Education     0.8052   0.6755   1.0000
      Belief     0.8076   1.0000
  Engagement     1.0000
                                                                    
               Engage~t   Belief Educat~n       ID lntime~n employ~t
Paired	  T-­‐Test	  of	  Industry Mean	  of	  Differences T-­‐Value Degrees	  of	  Freedom P-­‐Value
Between	  Total	  and	  ID 0 0.00E+00 8 1
Between	  Total	  and	  Belief 0 0.00E+00 8 1
Between	  Total	  and	  Education -­‐0.00111 -­‐9.00E-­‐04 8 0.9993
Between	  Total	  and	  Engagement 0.00111 -­‐8.00E-­‐04 8 0.9994
45	  	  
Works	  Cited	  	  
Baker,	  Ken,	  Personal	  Interview,	  April	  4th	  2013	  
	  
Blair	  M,	  Kruse	  D,	  Blasi	  J.	  Employee	  ownership:	  An	  unstable	  form	  or	  a	  stabilizing	  force?	  Buisness,	  	  
	  
	   Economics	  and	  Regulatory	  Policy.	  2000.	  
	  
Blasi	  J,	  Conte	  M,	  Kruse	  D.	  Employee	  stock	  ownership	  and	  corporate	  performance	  among	  public	  
companies.	  Industrial	  and	  Labor	  Relations	  Review.	  1996;50(1):60-­‐79.	  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2524389.	  
Bowles,	  Samuel,	  and	  Herbert	  Gintis.	  "A	  Political	  and	  Economic	  Case	  for	  the	  Democratic	  
Enterprise."	  Economics	  and	  Philosophy	  9.01	  (1993):	  75.	  Print.	  	  
De	  Geest,	  Gerrit,	  Jacques	  Siegers	  and	  Ann-­‐Sophie	  Vandenberghe(2001),	  ‘The	  Expectation	  
Measure,	  Labor	  Contracts,and	  the	  Incentive	  to	  Work	  Hard’,	  International	  Review	  of	  Law	  
and	  Economics’	  541-­‐560	  
Freeman	  S.	  Effects	  of	  ESOP	  adoption	  and	  employee	  ownership:	  Thirty	  years	  of	  research	  and	  
experience.	  Organizational	  Dynamics	  Working	  Papers.	  2007.	  
"Form	  5500	  Series."	  Annual	  Return/Report	  5500	  Series	  Forms	  and	  Instructions.	  N.p.,	  n.d.	  Web.	  
03	  May	  2013.	  
Harter	  J,	  Schmidt	  F,	  Keyes	  C.	  Well-­‐being	  in	  the	  workplace	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  business	  
outcomes	  	  A	  review	  of	  the	  gallup	  studies.	  Flourishing:	  The	  Positive	  Person	  and	  the	  Good	  
Life.	  2002:205.	  
Holmstrom,	  Bengt,	  and	  John	  Roberts.	  "Boundaries	  of	  the	  Firm	  Revisited."	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  
Perspectives	  12.4	  (Fall	  1998):	  73-­‐94.	  Print.	  
46	  	  
Klein,	  Katherine	  J.,	  and	  Rosalie	  J.	  Hall.	  "Correlates	  of	  Employee	  Satisfaction	  with	  Stock	  
Ownership:	  Who	  Likes	  an	  ESOP	  Most?"	  Journal	  of	  Applied	  Psychology	  73.4	  (1988):	  630-­‐
38.	  Print.	  	  
Klein,	  Katherine	  J.	  "Employee	  Stock	  Ownership	  and	  Employee	  Attitudes:	  A	  Test	  of	  Three	  
Models."	  Journal	  of	  Applied	  Psychology	  72.2	  (1987):	  319-­‐32.	  Print.	  	  
Kruse,	  Douglas.	  "Research	  Evidence	  on	  Prevalence	  and	  Effects	  of	  Employee	  
Ownership."Www.nceo.org.	  NCEO,	  n.d.	  Web.	  
Menke,	  John	  D.	  "The	  Origin	  and	  History	  of	  the	  ESOP	  and	  Its	  Future	  Role	  as	  a	  Business	  Succession	  
Tool."	  The	  Menke	  Group	  The	  Nations	  Premier	  ESOP	  Advisors	  and	  Administrators.	  N.p.,	  
n.d.	  Web.	  03	  May	  2013.	  	  
NCEO.	  A	  statistical	  profile	  of	  employee	  ownership.	  http://www.nceo.org/articles/statistical-­‐
profile-­‐employee-­‐ownership.	  Updated	  2012.	  Accessed	  12/19,	  2012.	  
Park,	  Rhokeun,	  Douglas	  Kruse,	  and	  James	  Sesil.	  "Does	  Employee	  Ownership	  Enhance	  Firm	  
Survival?"	  Advances	  in	  the	  Economic	  Analysis	  of	  Participatory	  and	  Labor-­‐Managed	  Firms	  
8	  (2004):	  3-­‐33.	  Print.	  	  
Pendleton,	  Andrew,	  Nicholas	  Wilson,	  and	  Mike	  Wright.	  "The	  Perception	  and	  Effects	  of	  Share	  
Ownership:	  Empirical	  Evidence	  from	  Employee	  Buy-­‐Outs."	  British	  Journal	  of	  Industrial	  
Relations	  36.1	  (1998):	  99-­‐123.	  Print.	  	  
"Research	  Evidence	  on	  Prevalence	  and	  Effects	  of	  Employee	  Ownership:	  2002	  Report	  by	  Douglas	  
Kruse,	  Rutgers	  University."	  Research	  Evidence	  on	  Prevalence	  and	  Effects	  of	  Employee	  
Ownership:	  2002	  Report	  by	  Douglas	  Kruse,	  Rutgers	  University.	  N.p.,	  n.d.	  Web.	  03	  May	  
2013.	  	  
Rodrick,	  Scott	  S.	  An	  Introduction	  to	  ESOPs.	  Oakland,	  CA:	  National	  Center	  for	  Employee	  
Ownership,	  2010.	  Print.	  	  
47	  	  
Weitzman	  M,	  Kruse	  D.,	  Blinder	  A.	  Profit	  sharing	  and	  productivity.	  Paying	  for	  Productivity.	  
1990:95.	  Stoneman,	  Diane	  “NewAge	  Industries:	  Celebrating	  a	  Half	  Century	  of	  Wealth	  Creation	  and	  Employee	  Engagement”,	  2010	  
